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LAND USE REGULATION: THE WEAK LINK IN
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
A. Dan Tarlock*
Abstract: Professor William Rodgers is one of the handful of legal academics who have
shaped and influenced environmental law since it was created out of whole cloth in the late
1960s. The staggering quantity, quality, breadth, and creativity of his scholarship are perhaps
unrivaled among his peers. It is easy to criticize the gap between the environmental problems
that society faces and the inadequate legal tools and institutions that we have created to
confront them. Professor Rodgers has always been able to see both the deep flaws in
environmental law and the possibilities for more responsive legal regimes.
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INTRODUCTION: PROPERTY IN LAND, NOT GREENED TO
THE SAME EXTENT AS AIR AND WATER

The sustainable use of land is crucial to the future success of many
environmental initiatives. We recognize that the planet consists of three
interrelated natural resources: air, water, and soil. Of the three, land has
remained more resistant to environmental protection duties compared to
the other two planetary life support systems, air and water. The
regulation of private land use to achieve environmental protection
objectives remains the weakest link in modem environmental law.!
Many of the major environmental challenges such as the control of nonpoint source water pollution, the conservation of biodiversity, and the
limitation of automobile emissions, including carbon dioxide, are at the
core of land use regulation problems. Yet, in the main, we continue to
develop and abuse land, regardless of environmental stresses that
development causes. As environmental protection once again rises on
the political agenda, the need to address the gap between land use
regulation and environmental protection is becoming more critical; the
regulatory gap impedes or cancels much of the progress that we have
made to improve the conditions of our air sheds and watersheds--Iet
alone confront the linked challenges of biodiversity conservation and
adaptation to global climate change.
The reasons for the gap are multiple. The mismatch between physical
problem areas and the crazy-quilt and increasingly dysfunctional overlay
of political jurisdictions is supported by a deep-seated resistance to land
use regulation. This contrasts with the wide-spread, if superficial,
acceptance for the regulation of air and water. These factors are reflected
by the difference in the property law regime for land versus that of air
and water. Air and water are and always have been common property
resources, and users have never had any expectation of exclusive
control. Regulation simply canceled the custom ofusing them as sinks,
but the state "took" no property from polluters because there were never
fIrm common law rights to degrade air. In addition to the limitations

1. A discussion of the role of federal and state lands in environmental protection is beyond the
scope of this brief essay.
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imposed on air and water pollution by the doctrine of nuisance, the right
to use water has always been an incomplete one. 2
Land is another story: it has resisted heroic academic efforts to green
it. The United States has successfully carved up the heritage of our land
base into a series of private, exclusive entitlements,3 limited federal
control largely to retained public lands, and enshrined the idea that land
should be controlled at the lowest level of government, if at all. This
process began with the English settlement iIi New England, and it
continues unabated. Western property law has a fundamental bias toward
the exploitation of all natural resources, especially land. The legislative
process has generally operated-at least until recently-to reinforce the
expectation that there will be few limits on resource exploitation. Our
property law is a product of the legacy of late Roman legal thought and
remains rooted in the idea of exclusive dominion subject only to the duty
not to cause a nuisance. For example, this view lies behind the Supreme
Court's dismissal of the argument that the purchaser of highly regulated
wetland property assumes the risk of development denial with the quip,
"[t]he [s]tate may not put so potent a Hobbesian stick into the Lockean
bundle.,,4 Locke himself might be surprised that his labor theory has now
incorporated the Roman law right of ius abutendi, the right to destroy
property. Both the common law and the police power temper this
discretion, but the bottom line is that it is still much harder to limit
activities that degrade ecosystems than to limit air, soil, and water as
waste disposal sinks.
This essay examines the reasons for the regulatory gap and suggests
some possible steps that can be taken to close it. It is a modest effort to
apply the spirit and vision· of Professor Rodgers to the fiendishly
difficult problem of integrating land use and environmental law. It
examines the assumptions that were made about land use at the dawn of
environmental law in the mid-1960s, the frustration of these expectations
by events since the late 1960s, and some-I hope-provocative
suggestions to recapture the early hope of the full integration of land use
regulation with the project of environmental protection.

2. In re Water Use Pennit Applications for Interim Instream Flow Standard Amendments, and
Petitions for Water Reservations for the Waiahole Ditch, 9 P.3d 409,492-95 (Haw. 2000).

3. See generally Eric T. Freyfogle, THE LAND WE SHARE: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
COMMON GOOD (2003).
4. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 627 (2001).
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II.

THE EXPECTED GREENING OF LAND IN THE MYTHIC
1960s

A.

The Hope ofRationality in the 1960s

During the formative period of environmenta11aw in the now mythic
1960s, the expectation was that land would be subjected to
comprehensive environmental regulation along with air and water.
Environmental law and environmentalism are usually portrayed as the
immediate by products of the turbulent late 1960s because the movement
gained instant political legitimacy from 1968-72. "But, many of the
deeper roots and influences have been ignored. A crucial root is the
rationalism and optimism of the administrations of John F. Kennedy and
the pre-Vietnam War administration of Lyndon B. Johnson. Our fIrst
major environmental law, the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 (NEPA),5 illustrates the expectation that all resources would be
subjected to the discipline of scientifIc environmentalism.
NEPA was drafted and enacted at the height of one of the most
turbulent periods of twentieth century social unrest, 6 but in fact, it
reflects the hopes, however naive, of the more earnest and optimistic
early 1960s. From 1961-69, the Department ofInterior was run by one
of our greatest secretaries of Interior, Steward Udall. Udall was also our
most thoughtful public fIgure to adopt environmentalism with the
possible exception of former Vice President Albert Gore. Secretary
Udall's 1964 book, The Quiet Crisis,? written with the assistance of the
great western environmentalist and novelist, Wallace Stegner, is a
seminal book because it popularized Aldo Leopold's "Land Ethic" and
Rachael Carson's work on the dangers of pesticide use, and it urged the
adoption of holistic environmental thinking as a public policy norm.
More generally, the Kennedy and Johnson administrations sought to
adapt the expert New Deal administrative state to address new midtwentieth century values such as environmental protection.
Land use was an integral part of the foundational thinking in tlie early
1960s that produced the environmental movement. The main idea was
that the "environment," i.e., the protection of natural ecosystems, was a

5. 43 U.s.C. § 4331 et seq. (2006).
6. See generally Todd Gitlin, THE SIXTIES: YEARS OF HOPE, DAYS OF RAGE (1987).
7. Stewart L. Udall, THE QUIET CRISIS (with an introduction by John F. Kennedy) (1963).
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suitable public policy focus, and thus Congress could mandate a
consistent, comprehensive protection strategy through the entire federal
bureaucracy. Secretary of Interior Stewart Udall set out to revive and
adapt the public land-focused conservation tradition to the new
emerging, more comprehensive environmental consciousness. This said,
it is important to note that Udall's thinking about land was squarely in
the evolving conservationist tradition: governments should devote more
and more land to wilderness and acquire land for open space.
The modem environmenta1 movement inherited the early twentieth
century preservation movement's idea that sacred and spectacular nature
should not be disturbed by human intervention. This idea was reflected,
for example, in the Wilderness Act of 1964. 8 Modem environmentalism
soon moved from the spiritual and aesthetic to the scientific by making
the relatively new idea of the inherently stable ecosystem, rather than
sacred space, the focus of protection. 9 Writing about the rise of
environmentalism in the 1950s and 1960s, Richard N. L. Andrews
observed, "[t]he most revolutionary element of the new public
consciousness was the powerful new awareness of the environment as a
living system--a 'web of life' or ecosystem-rather than just a
storehouse of commodities to be extracted or a chemical machine to be
manipulated."lo The ecosystem construct is a major advance, but it came
at the expense of the ability to articulate a popular, new land ethic.
B.

Three Crucial Assumptions About Land and Land Law and Its Role
in the Environmental Protection Project

As the rational environmentalism of the 1960s evolved, at least three
further crucial assumptions about land were made. These assumptions
and efforts to integrate environmental protection and land use are now
buried in history, with one exception, or have been supplanted by
changes in the law. The first assumption was that land use regulation
would occur with minimal control from state and federal courts. The
Supreme Court had not decided a zoning case since 1928 and thus had

8. 16 U.S.C. §§ l13l-l136(2)(c) and 16 U.S.C. § 113 1(c) (2006) (defining wilderness as an area
"where the earth and its community oflife are untrammeled by man.").

9. See generally Michael J. McCloskey (then Chairman of the Sierra Club), Changing Views of
What the Wilderness System Is All About, 76 DENVER L. REv. 369 (1999) (discussing differences
between the "natural" and ecological views of the function of the national wilderness system).
10. Richard N. L. Andrews, MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT, MANAGING OURSELVES: A
HISTORY OF AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 202 (1999).
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not fleshed out Justice Holmes's opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon. ll Pennsylvania Coal created the concept of a regulatory taking
as opposed to a title expropriation, but Justice Holmes's
characteristically flip statement that regulation that goes "too far" did not
yet have the chilling effect that the Supreme Court's taking
jurisprudence continues to exert on land use regulation. 12 The threat of
the use of the Fifth Amendment to invalidate both air and water
pollution standards, as well as land use regulations, was recognized, but
Supreme Court intervention in environmental protection, including land
use, was not considered a major threat. For example, an early Council on
Environmental Quality Report asserted that the takings clause applied
only to expropriations of title, not regulations. 13
The second assumption was that there would be federal land planning
guidelines. Senator Henry Jackson of Washington State was the
embodiment of rational environmentalism in the 1960s. He wanted to
balance, not stop, development with environmental protection and
mitigation. Under his chairmanship, the Senate Committee on Interior
and Insular Affairs issued a report in 1972 that criticized the delegation
of state planning and regulation to local governments. 14 In 1973, the
Committee reported out S. 268, the National Land Use Policy and
Planning Assistance Act, which provided grants to states to develop a
planning and regulatory process that included the control of "areas of
critical environmental concem.,,15 The bill suffered the fate of almost all
post-New Deal efforts to bring ecological and hydrological rationality to
irrational political boundaries: intense local and state opposition. It was
narrowly defeated in 1974, and any effort for general federal land use
planning disappeared from the political agenda, never to reappear.

11. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
12. Richard J. Lazarus, Thirty Years ofEnvironmental Protection Law in the Supreme Court, 19
PACEENVTL. L. REv. 619, 637 (2002)
13. Fred Bosselman, David Callies, and David Banta, THE TAKING ISSUE 238-83 (1973).
14. Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, National Land Use Policy: Background
Papers on Past and Pending Legislation and the Roles of the Executive Branch, Congress and the
States in Land Use Planning and Policy, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).

15. Id. § 203(3)(A). There is no constitutional constraint on federal regulation ofland use related
to interstate commerce. See Hodel v. Indiana, 481 U.S. 704 (1987). However, the current Supreme
Court has invoked interference with state land control as a justification for a presumption that
Congress has not authorized a regulation. Solid Waste Mgmt. Agency ofN. Cook County v. U.S.
Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (Section 404 of Clean Water Act construed to exclude
regulation of isolated wetlands because of doubts about Congress's power to do so under
Commerce Clause)..
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The third assumption was that states would use federal support to
claw back their delegated land use regulation powers. Hawaii, Oregon,
and Vermont would lead the way toward the progressive centralization
of land use planning at the state or regional level. The American Law
Association adopted a Model Land Development Code in 1976, which
authorized state review of developments of regional significance and the
use of land use controls to regulate air and water pollution. 16
III. WHAT HAPPENED TO FRUSTRATE THESE EXPECTATIONS
A.

Fragmented, Problem Oriented Federal "Land" Use Legislation

In place of general federal land use planning law, state and local land
use laws were left in place, with some minor exceptions, such as cellular
towers, but federal regulatory programs were selectively superimposed
over them. The most well known example of this selective
superimposition is the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972. 17 In
return for adopting plans for coastal areas, states can deny development
authority to federal activities and licenses that are inconsistent with the
state's program. 18
We have an incomplete federal program of "sensitive land"
protection. Activities such as the filling of a wetland l9 or the
development of the habitat of a listed endangered species require a
federal permit in addition to compliance with all state and local
regulations. These activities can trigger innovative local land use
regulatory programs. For example, section 9 of the Endangered Species
Act20 prohibits the "taking" of a listed species, and taking can include
habitat modification that puts a species at risk. 21 In a few states, such as
California and Texas, the fear that section 9 would stop all land

16. MODEL LAND DEV. CODE § 7-204 (1976).
17. 16 U.S.C. § 1451 et seq. (2006).
18. New Jersey v. Delaware (Orig. 134 Report of Special Master, Apr. 16, 2007), available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/SpecMastRpt/SpecMastRpt.htm!.
(Coastal
Zone
Management Act permits Delaware to deny LNG terminal in its portion of bed of Delaware River).
19. The criteria include a showing of no practical alternatives, and this may require an inquiry
into the availability of alternative locations under local land use plans and regulations for the
activity.
20. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (1973).
21. Babbit v. Sweet Home Chapter ofCmtys for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 696-708 (1995).
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development has led to federal-state-Iocal cooperation to develop
multiple species habitat protection plans that require the regulation of
private land, as well as habitat acquisition. Beyond these programs,
federal regulation is weak. NEPA applies to the "built environment," so
most large federal facilities that will trigger development in developing
areas must prepare an impact analysis or statement that examines the
growth impacts on the surrounding areas and explores alternatives.
NEPA, however, has had very little impact on local land use policies.
Thus, proponents of biodiversity conservation and other environmental
objectives are forced to try and adapt existing land use regulations to this
end. 22 They face the endless problem of fitting round pegs into square
holes.
B.

Growth Unabated

For decades, planners and students of urbanization have decried the
economic, environmental, and aesthetic costs of sprawl. The reality is
that there are almost no incentives for local communities, except a few
developed, wealthy ones, to place substantial barriers in the way of
continued urbanization. 23 The United States continues to grow in
absolute numbers and to consume land far in excess of the amounts
needed to accommodate this growth. Growth management, or its current
incarnation, "Smart Growth," is simply growth accommodation. Smart
Growth and its legacy, new urbanism, try to make growth a bit more
compact and clustered around transportation hubs where available.
Urban settlement patterns in the United States reflect the broader social
divides in twenty-first century America. Some cities and older "upscale"
suburbs are "europeanizing" by developing denser, mixed use, streetoriented environments, while the majority of Americans live in ever
expanding suburban areas, happy to drive everywhere. And, the Quiet
Revolution has become a counter revolution. Most land use remains
local or, at best-as in the Seattle region~quasi-regional.

22. See generally, e.g., Robert B. McKinistry, Jr. et aI., BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION
HANDBOOK (Environmental Law Institute 2006).
23. See generally Jonathan Levine, ZONED OUT: REGULATION, MARKETS, AND CHOICES IN
TRANSPORTATION AND METROPOLITAN LAND USE (2006).
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C.

The Supreme Court "Over" Interested Itselfin Zoning

In the late 1970s, after almost five decades of silence, the Supreme
Court began to review local zoning decisions under the First and Fifth
Amendments. Forests have been cut down to support the commentary on
the Court's new taking jurisprudence because Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Councip4 threatened to introduce a new "Lochner Era" of
selective judicial invalidation of a wide range of local land use
regulation. Although subsequent Supreme Court opinions have narrowed
and isolated Lucas,25 the Court's taking jurisprudence still exerts a
chilling effect on environmental regulation for three reasons. First,
stringent regulations may trigger either the Lucas per se rule or be found
to be a taking under the Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City ofNew
York 6 balancing test. Second, the Court still remains hostile to the very
foundation of environmentalism: the idea that the fundamental unit to be
protected is the ecosystem, rather than the arbitrary parcel and political
boundaries into which we have carved the surface of the planet. This
perspective can lead to a more expansive view of damage from activities
on parcels that adversely impact either the functioning of the ecosystem
or the services that it provides. Finally, the Court has either expressly or
impliedly shifted much of the burden of justifying land use regulations,
especially exactions, to local governments?? The presumption of validity
on which the pre-Rehnquist Court land use law was based continues to
be invoked but it is increasingly being weakened by courts.
IV. INTEGRATING LAND USE AND ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION
The difficulties of integrating land use regulation with environmental
protection start with the lack of a coherent vision of a mixed urbanized
and non-urbanized landscape. We have only two coherent landscape
visions. In the United States, we have either fenced off landscapes from

24. 505 U.s. 1003 (1992).
25. Most notably, Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005) (reversing an earlier
"substantially advances legitimate state interest" test because it is a due process, not takings,
inquiry); and Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535
U.S. 302 (2002) (holding that a reasonable moratoria on lalld development does not constitute a
taking).
26. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).

27. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
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development under public land laws, such as the wilderness system, or
through public and private acquisition of open space, or we have
tolerated (encouraged) endless low-density development. Landscapes
have traditionally been seen as canvases to be improved upon by human
intervention. 28 The net result is that all land use has been seen as a
transitional stage in an endless process of dynamic change. 29 In contrast,
European planning has had a more static, integrated view of the built
landscape. It has proceeded from a vision of a compact and dense city,
surrounded by a tranquil and well-ordered countryside. This is not the
case in the United States: we have primarily defined our cultural heritage
as our rugged, isolated wilderness landscapes/a not human settlements. 31
It is a wonderful vision but totally useless to deal with an urban and
urbanizing country. Some specific efforts to remedy this problem follow.

A.

Round Pegs in Square Holes Redux

The most realistic integration scenario is simply the continuation of
the present system. Local governments with the political will to pursue

28. See Simon Schama's fascinating discussion of the didactic functions of sixteenth and
seventeenth century palace gardens. Simon Schama, LANDSCAPE AND MEMORY 268-81 (1995).
29. My colleague Fred Bosselman has characterized Illinois land use law as the product of
nineteenth century attitudes that "caused its residents to view land itself simply as another form of
capital that could be made 'abstract, standardized and fungible' through the an 'alchemy' of
commodification." Fred P. Bosselman, The Commodification of 'Nature's Metropolis: The
Historical Context of Illinois' Unique Zoning Standards, 12 NORTlIERN ILL. L. REv. 527, 531
(1992).
30. Joseph L. Sax, MOUNTAINS WITHOUT HANDRAILS 5-26 (1980).
31. There is a long tradition of growth management in the United States which reflects the
European preference for compact, orderly development that results in a clear urban-rural
demarcation, but its impact is spotty at best. See generally Timothy Beatley and Kristy Manning,
THE ECOLOGY OF PLACE: PLANNING FOR ENVIRONMENT, ECONOMY, AND COMMUNITY (1997). The
root problem is that compact landscapes are alien to the American experience. The settlement
patterns of Central Europe produced clustered villages surrounded by individual fields and common
pastures. Urban centers developed around the old Roman centers, and the Koeingsburgen (royal
cities) Cities were walled religious and commercial centers with well-defined limits that grew
slowly until the eighteenth century. The rise of the nation-state after the Peace of Westphalia gave
rise to the modern theory of city planning, and the model of the orderly city remains the dominant
vision in Europe and among American planners. Many buildings were destroyed in the Thirty
Years' War and theories of the ideal town emerged. E. A. Gutkind's URBAN DEVELOPMENT IN
CENTRAL EUROPE 197 (1964). The history of pre-twentieth century history of city planning is a
history of platting. John Reps, TOWN PLANNING IN FRONTIER AMERICA (1965). The low density
tradition has been carried out as people move further and further out from the city center in what a
leading historian has called the Crabgrass Frontier. Kenneth T. Jackson, THE CRABGRASS
FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZA'TION OF THE UNITED STATES (1985).

660

Land Use Regulation
environmental objectives will continue to adapt a body of law primarily
designed to curtail the presumed nuisance-like characteristics of a use
within a small geographic area to the broader project of environmental
protection. 32 The mismatch between the geography of scale of problem
areas, such as the Puget Sound ecosystem, and local political
jurisdictions would seem to be an insurmountable barrier, but
incremental solutions are advanced as the only realistic choice. 33 On the
plus side, continued large-scale public and private land acquisition will
ameliorate some of the jurisdictional mismatches.
B.

Environmental Protection Overlays or Special Protection Areas

The regulation of land for environmental purposes is extremely
difficult because there are no accepted baselines against which change
can be measured. The problems of air and water baselines are hard
enough, but it is possible to develop relatively coherent models of the
resource minus specified amounts of degrading pollutants. It is possible
to estimate many of the adverse environmental impacts of land
development, but it is not easy to move from proj ected impact to a
regulatory standard.
The development of land use baselines in the frontier culture of
America is primarily a cultural problem rather than a technical one. In
response to environmentalism, land use law has developed a new
category of fragile or environmentally sensitive lands. In some areas,
new legal regimes have been superimposed over existing ones to make
environmental protection the dominant land use objective. The
conceptual basis of these efforts is the concept of carrying capacity. Ian
McHarg, the late, noted landscape architect, developed the concept in
the late 1960s to serve as an upper limit on land development. 34 The idea
is well-entrenched in environmental planning, but examples of
successful implementation remain rare.
The best example of the use of carrying-capacity as the regulatory
baseline is the 1980 Tahoe Regional Planning Compact. 35 It mandates

32. These efforts are detailed in John R. Nolan, In Praise ofParochialism: The Advent ofLocal
Environmental Law, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 365 (2005).
33. Jamison E. Colburn, Localisms Ecology: Protecting and Restoring Habitat in the Suburban
Nation, 33 ECOLOGY L. Q. 945, 991-1001 (2006).

34. See generally Ian L. McHarg, DESIGN WITH NATURE (1969).
35. Pub. L. No. 96-551, 94 Stat. 3233 (1980).
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the development of "environmental threshold capacities" for land
development in the Tahoe Basin. Developers must demonstrate that the
proposed development will not impair progress toward the air, soil, and
water standards designed to preserve the exceptional quality of Lake
Tahoe. In addition, private land conservancies in California and Nevada,
along with the United States Forest Service, have been active in land
acquisition and withdrawal to complement regulation. However, the
price for this success is high, both in terms of economic opportunity
costs and social-environmental opportunity costs. A leading landscape
planner has observed that
The general effect of the thresholds and the embodied Land
Capability System has been to freeze the historic pattern of land
use, and to dramatically limit new development to pre-existing
lots and commercial parcels. This is not because the old pattern
is desirable ... [but] [r]e-shaping the pattern to better fit land
capabilities and transit objectives through TDR [Transferable
Development Rights] or similar tools is nearly out of the
question because the impacts would come from further raw-land
disturbance. 36

C.

Toughen Supreme Court Takings Jurisprudence

Many in the environmental community argue that property needs to
be "greened"; that is, the Supreme Court and state courts should expand
the category of externalities that a government can constitutionally
regulate to include off-site ecosystem impairment. I offer a slightly
different take on the greening project by focusing on a related problem:
United States land use law creates too many incentives to assume bad,
predictable risks of environmental degradation and very few incentives
to avoid the consequences of the risk. Efforts to design more
environmentally sustainable landscapes must impose the economic
doctrine of moral hazard on public and private land use decisions.
Economists and students of natural disasters have long argued that it
is economically irrational to encourage people to locate in the face of
danger, such as a flood plain or vulnerable hurricane zone, and then
demand to be compensated when damage occurs. However, both law
and a long history of charity toward the victims of fate have created the

36. Robert H. Twiss, Planning and Land Regulation at Lake Tahoe: Five Decades ofExperience,
BIG PLACES, BIG PLANS 83, 93 (2004).
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expectation that the inefficient assumption of risky land use choices will
be rewarded, not penalized. Economists call taking inefficient risks with
the expectation that the government will foot the bill the moral hazard
problem. Of course, there are important differences among types of
location choices and disasters. However, with few exceptions, all levels
of government encourage and reward landowners for moral hazards and
the law rewards risk takers who should instead be penalized.
The incentive to assume risks starts with the Fifth Amendment to the
federal constitution and continues through the well-justified expectation
that the federal government will compensate the victims of a wide range
of natural disasters. The long history of the construction of flood control
projects and a federal flood insurance program that still encourages
building in high-risk areas are prime examples of the creation of
perverse incentives to take bad risks underpinned by the Fifth
Amendment. The fundamental problem is not with the basic idea of
helping victims of natural disasters, but with our inability to distinguish
between protecting deserving victims and subsidizing risk takers. The
political process is, of course, endlessly open to blunt efforts to create
incentives to minimize the damages caused by extreme natural events in
advance of their occurrence. 37
The idea that land owners have no responsibility to avoid moral
hazards is built into the constitutional conception of property and lies at
the heart of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Counciz3 8 and subsequent
cases, most notably Palazzolo v. Rhode Island. 39 Lucas held that a
complete elimination of the value of property for development can be a
categorical taking and applied a categorical taking analysis to a state
beachfront set back statute. 40 It recognized that there is a limited class of
common background exceptions to title,41 such as the duty not to use

37. Vicki Been, Lucas v. The Green Machine: Using the Takings Clause to Promote More
Efficient Regulation?, in PROPERTY STORIES 221 (Gerald Komgo1d & Andrew P. Morriss eds.,
2004) (detailing how efforts to protect South Carolina's fragile beaches were rolled back after Lucas
contrary to the theory that takings law promotes the adoption of efficient regulatory programs).
38. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
39. 533 U.S. 606, 627 (2001).
40. S.C. Code § 48-39-250 et seq. (2006).
41. See generally Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, Lucas's Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of
Background Principles As Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 HARv. L. REv. 321 (2005) (surveying
the post-Lucas cases and finding that the background limitation defense is growing). Many of the
examples of the defense's use involve resources, such as water, fishing quotas, and public land
mining, where the expectation of exclusive dominion has always been lower than it has for land.
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one's property to cause a nuisance, but it refused to accept the state's
rationale that the regulation prevented the destruction of other property
during hurricanes. Most of the critical environmental commentary has
focused on the Court's hostility to the idea of environmental regulation
unaccompanied by full compensation. However, the plurality's rejection
of the state's damage prevention argument illustrates that the modem
notion of property remains rooted in the notion of exclusive dominion,
subject only to the duty not to cause a narrow class of "common law"
nuisances. 42

D.

Fix Ecosystems Not Problems

Driven by the need to avoid the full force of the EPA, we have
embarked on a series of land and water management experiments to
"fix" a problem: the survival of a listed species. The object of the fix is
to allow the maximum development consistent with the conservation of
the minimum number of a species. These "fixes" are large experiments
(with no control group) and take various forms, from ad hoc stakeholder
groups convened to work cooperatively together to solve the problem
within existing statutory schemes, to those, such as the Everglades
restoration, with a specific statutory regime. It is too early to assess the
success of these experiments and opinion is divided. On the pro side,
these experiments have been hailed as important first steps to
bioregionalism and as examples of "modular regulation." Modular
regulation is seen by some as the logical evolution of the post-modem
state, which can no longer be effectively governed from the top. The con
argument is that experiments substitute process 43 for substance and
reflect the loss of national political will to confront hard environmental
problems at the federal level.
In my opinion, all these experiments are built on a fatal assumption:
process will lead to harmony and long term ecosystem protection. But
most regulatory decisions are still relatively small-scale, individual
adjustments. The result can be analogized to fitting the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle together with no expectation that a clear picture will ever

42. For an argument that the common law of nuisance can adapt to ecosystem service provisions,
see J.B. Rubl, Steven E. Kraft, Christopher L. Lant, THE LAW AND POLICY OF ECOSYSTEM
SERVICES (2007).
43. I have characterized them as "third best solutions," that is, solutions with a high risk of
failure. A. Dan Tarlock, Three Challenges for Professor Nolan, 23 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 697, 70204 (2006).
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emerge. We should start by defining the substantive goals of the process.
The goal should be a map that, within the constraints of fixed settlement
patterns, designates remaining functioning ecosystems and identifies the
indices of function to be maintained. 44 Once the map is fixed, we need
some combination of incentives and constraints to maintain the
identified systems over time. First, we need a variant of the once-model
Oregon land planning system. Oregon's 1973 law imposed substantive
state planning goals on local communities,45 but no good deed goes
unpunished, and in 2004 the law was eviscerated by an initiative
measure. 46 Second, we need fmancial incentives similar to what New
Jersey used to spur the construction of low and moderate income
housing. New Jersey courts repeatedly held that all communities had to
provide a fair share of opportunities to construct low and moderate
income housing. 47 But, it was not until the state passed legislation
allowing developing communities to shift up to fifty-percent of their
obligations to developed areas that compliance with the fair share
mandate began in earnest. 48 In the Puget Sound region, cities such as
Seattle could meet their fair share of Puget Sound ecosystem
conservation duties by paying for needed land acquisitions in rural areas.
Implementation of such a scheme is perhaps impossible in today's
political climate, but if we are to make any progress in integrating land
use and federal environmental law, we have to demarcate more clearly
and narrowly where development can and cannot go. The decades-long
argument that regulation should be subordinated to planning has borne
some fruit and there are many large-scale planned communities being
built in growing areas, and these proposals are built on these
developments. The New Jersey solution to fair share housing duties,
criticized as it is, illustrates that we need to provide small political units
some flexibility in complying with ecosystem restoration mandates. And

44. Efforts to do have spawned intense debates among scientists. See John Copeland Nagle & J.B.
Ruhl, THE LAW OF BIODIVERSITY AND ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT 340-50 (2006).
45. Or. Rev. Stat. § 197.005-860.
46. Measure 37, which allows property owners to claim the difference between the value of the
property before and after regulation, was upheld by the Oregon Supreme Court. MacPherson v.
Dep't of Admin. Servs., 130 P.3d 308 (Or. 2006). See Edward 1. Sullivan & Carrie A. Richter, A

Taste of Ashes-The MacPherson Decision and the Future of Oregon's Planning Program, 58
PLANNING AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, No.4, p. 3 (2006).
47. S. Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel (II), 456 A.2d 390, 418 (N.J.
1983).
48. N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 52.27D-301 et seq. (2006).
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as many participants at the conference emphasized: it's the money and
land acquisition, stupid.
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